The community structure and the robustness are two important properties of networks for analyzing the functionality of complex systems. The community structure is crucial to understand the potential functionality of complex systems, while the robustness is indispensable to protect the functionality of complex systems from malicious attacks. When a network suffers from an unpredictable attack, its structural integrity would be damaged. Earlier studies focused on the integrity of the node structure or the edge structure when a network suffers from a single-level malicious attack on the nodes or the edges. In this study, we model the attack on the network as a two-level targeted one. Then, we propose a community robustness index to evaluate the integrality of the community structure when the network suffers from the modeled attack. The proposed index plays an important role in analyzing the ability of the real systems to resist unpredictable failures. Finally, based on the proposed community robustness index, a greedy algorithm is devised to mitigate the network attack. Experiments on three real network systems show that with minor changes in links the community robustness of networks can be greatly improved. The results also demonstrate that the community structures in the optimized networks remain practically unchanged compared with the original ones. 
airlines cannot work normally due to the terrible weather or 48 the terrorist attacks. In power grids networks, the electricity 49 cannot be transmitted due to the failures of generators.
50
The robustness of networks is usually measured by a 51 criterion that considers the critical fraction of networks 52 * Electronic address: gong@ieee.org when they collapse completely [12] . This measure overlooks 53 situations in which the networks suffer from a big damage but 54 they are not completely collapsing [14] . Recently, Schneider 55 et al. [14] proposed a measure, node robustness (R n ), to 56 evaluate the robustness of networks under node attacks. When 57 nodes are gradually damaged due to random failures or targeted 58 attacks, a network may be split into several unconnected parts. 59 The node robustness (R n ) considers the size of the largest 60 connected component during all possible node attacks, namely 61 R n = 1 N N q=1 s (q) , where N is the number of nodes in the 62 network and s(q) is the integrity of nodes in the largest 63 connected part after removing q nodes [14] . The normalization 64 factor 1/N makes it possible to make a comparison of the node 65 robustness between networks with different sizes. Generally, 66 the larger the value of R n , the more robust the network 67 is. Schneider et al. [14, 15] and Wu et al. [16] proposed 68 some greedy techniques to optimize R n . In their studies, they 69 found that (1) the node robustness of networks can be greatly 70 improved by modifying small parts of links without changing 71 the total links and the degree of each node; (2) the optimal 72 network for node robustness shares a common onion structure 73 in which high-degree nodes are hierarchically surrounded by 74 rings of nodes with decreasing degree [14, 15] . Zeng and Liu 75 extended their works and proposed a measure, link robustness 76 R l , for network robustness under malicious attacks on the 77 links [17] . Similarly, the link robustness of networks can 78 also be greatly improved by changing small parts of links. 79 Moreover, there were a few studies working on the catastrophic 80 cascade of failures in interdependent networks [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . In 81 addition, Schneider et al. proposed a method that identifies 82 the autonomous nodes based on their degrees and centrality 83 to maximize the robustness of coupled networks [24] . The 84 robustness of coupled networks can be largely enhanced by 85 establishing a few autonomous nodes. Their researches are 86 crucial to create robust networks against possible malicious 87 attacks in practical applications. least one article during any part of calendar year 1999 or 146 2000. The toy network can be divided into 8 communities by 147 the community detection algorithm BGLL [28] . As shown in 148 Fig. 1 
151
It is possible for the nodes or the edges of networks to 152 suffer from damages. There may be a situation in which a 153 set of nodes that have similar properties are damaged at the 154 same time. Namely, the communities of networks could also 155 possibly suffer from damages. As shown in Fig. 1 , the toy 156 network will be divided into several unconnected parts when 157 a few nodes, edges, or communities are removed. Moreover, 158 the damages caused by removing communities are greater than 159 the damages caused by removing nodes or edges.
160
The network property having dense interconnections makes 161 the real system resilient against random failures but vulner-162 able to targeted attacks [14] . Therefore, the studies on the 163 robustness of networks under targeted attacks are useful to the 164 security of real systems. In this study, we model the attack 165 on the network as a two-level targeted one. The first level is 166 the small-scale targeted attack that occurs on nodes with the 167 largest degrees. The second level is the large-scale targeted 168 attack under which the most influential communities that have 169 the maximal number of intercommunity links are removed 170 gradually. We use a dynamic approach that recalculates the 171 degrees of each node and the importance of each community 172 during the attack. The dynamic way corresponds to a more 173 harmful attack strategy [12] .
174
In the real world, it is possible for attacks on nodes and 175 communities to happen. According to whether they can occur 176 simultaneously, the attack strategies can be classified into 177 two categories. The first one is the weighted strategy that 178 simulates the situation in which the attacks on nodes and 179 communities cannot happen simultaneously. In this case, the 180 small-scale attacks on nodes and the large-scale attacks on 181 communities are possible to occur but not simultaneously. 182 In the absence of prior knowledge about which attacks will 183 
B. Community robustness of networks

214
The measures in Refs. [14, 17] for the robustness of 215 networks consider the integrality of the node structure or the 216 edge structure. However, these measures can hardly reflect 217 the functional integrality of the network. We thus propose 218 a measure, the community robustness R c , to evaluate the 219 community integrality of networks under malicious attacks.
220
The community robustness of a network is defined as
where m is the number of the possible malicious attacks on the 
230
For the weighted attack strategy, the community robustness 231 of networks under the small-scale node attacks and the 232 large-scale community attacks is necessary to be considered, 233 respectively. The community robustness of a network under 234 the small-scale targeted attack can be written as
where N is the number of nodes in the network and S pq is 236 the number of the remaining nodes in the community p when 237 q nodes are removed.
is the community 238 integrality of the network after removing q nodes. When each 239 community of the network has the same size, R c1 would be 240 equal to R n .
241
The community robustness of a network under the large-242 scale targeted attack can be written as
where S 2 (u) is the community integrality of the network after 244 removing u communities. As shown in Fig. 1 (b), R c2 measures 245 the node integrality of the new generated network whose nodes 246 are the communities of its original network and edges are the 247 connections among these communities.
248
In practical applications, it is necessary to consider the 249 malicious attacks at both levels because they are possible to 250 happen but we cannot know which attack will occur in advance. 251 Accordingly, the community robustness of a network under the 252 weighted attack is modeled as
where α, 0 α 1, is a weighting coefficient. When 0.5 < 254 α 1, the measure mainly focuses on the community ro-255 bustness of a network under the small-scale targeted node 256 attack. When 0 α < 0.5, the measure mainly considers the 257 community robustness of a network under the large-scale 258 targeted community attack.
259
For the mixed attack strategy, the community robustness of 260 a network can be defined as follows:
where L is the total number of steps to reduce the size of 262 the giant component to 1 [17] . R m evaluates the community 263 robustness of a network when the network suffers from the 264 small-scale and the large-scale attacks simultaneously. The 265 probability with which the attack at each level occurs is 266 controlled by a mixing parameter f (0 f 1). When f = 0, 267 it means that the network is more likely to suffer from the 268 G 1 .
289
In order to identify that the optimized networks for than that in the same country. Therefore, the constraints 305 keeping the number of links, the degree of each node, and 306 the number of intracommunity links of each community 307 invariant for link changes are much closer to practical 308 applications.
309
D. Enhancing community robustness of networks
310
The framework to enhance the community robustness of 311 networks under the above constraints is shown in Fig. 4 . 312 First, the network is divided into a set of communities, 313 using any community detection algorithms. In this study, we 314 choose the community detection algorithm BGLL [28] . The 315 algorithm BGLL is effective and efficient for uncovering the 316 community structures of networks. More importantly, in the 317 absence of prior knowledge of the number of communities, it 318 can automatically detect the "right" number of communities. 319 Then, we devise a greedy algorithm to optimize R c under 320 the proposed constraints. It works as follows: Starting from 321 an original network G, two edges e ab and e cd are randomly 322 selected. Swap the connections of e ab and e cd to e ad and e bc , 323 if the swap satisfies the constraints for link changes, and set 324 the resulting network as G . Update G with G at a certain 325 probability, which is decided by the difference between R c 326 and R c , where R c and R c are the community robustness of G 327 and G , respectively. As shown in Fig. 4 , G is updated with 328 G at the probability exp −|R c −R c |/T , where T is a parameter, 329 which controls the convergence speed of the algorithm to an 330 optimal solution. The algorithm is easier to converge to an 331 optimal solution when the value of T is small (here, we set it 332 as 10 −4 ). The above operations will not stop until no further 333 improvement can be achieved for a given large number of 334 consecutive swapping trials t max (here, we set it as 10 4 ). In 335
Divide the original network G into a set of communities S={s 1 , s 2 , …, s k }, using community detection algorithm BGLL; Compute community robustness R c of the network G and set t =0.
Update G and R c with G' and R' c , respectively.
Swap the connections of e ab and e cd to e ad and e bc and set the resulting network as G'; Compute its community robustness R' c ; Generate a rand value r.
Select randomly two edges, e ab and e cd, from G and set t = t+1. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
342
In this section, first, we introduce the evaluation metrics. 
A. Evaluation metrics
357
In this study, beside using R n and R c to evaluate the 358 robustness of networks, the following criteria are also adopted 359 to illustrate the difference between the optimized and the 360 original networks.
361
Normalized mutual information. Normalized mutual in-362 formation (I ) [29] is to estimate the similarity between two 363 network partitions. If the original and the optimized network 364 partitions are p 1 and p 2 , respectively, the normalized mutual 365 information I (p 1 ,p 2 ) is computed as and N is the number of nodes [30] . If the optimized network The spectrum index. The spectrum index (λ 1 /λ 2 ), namely 376 the ratio of the largest and second-largest eigenvalue of 377 the adjacency matrix of the network, is adopted to eval-378 uate the robustness of networks [31] . The researches in 379 Ref. [16, 17] indicate that the spectrum index has a certain 380 positive correlation with R n . It is also found that the optimiza-381 tion of R n tends to generate an onion structure in which nodes 382 with almost the same degree are connected [14] [15] [16] [17] . In this 383 study, we try to find the relation between λ 1 /λ 2 and R c .
384
The relative robustness improvement. The relative ro-385 bustness improvement is computed as R/R 0 − 1, where R 386 and R 0 represent the robustness of the optimized and the 387 original networks, respectively. When R = R n , the criterion 388 R/R 0 − 1 represents the improvement of the node robustness 389 of networks. When R = R c , the criterion R/R 0 − 1 represents 390 the improvement of the community robustness of networks 391 under the modeled attacks. We also study the improvement of 392 the community robustness of networks under the small-scale 393 and the large-scale attacks, respectively. The relation between 394 R/R 0 − 1 and the parameter α is analyzed to choose a suitable 395 value of α for practical applications.
396
Modularity. Modularity (Q), proposed by Grivan and 397 Newman [8] , is widely adopted to evaluate the quality of the 398 partition dividing a network into communities. Let k be the 399 number of communities found, the modularity is defined as
where l s i is the total intracommunity links, and K s i represents 401 the total degree of the community s i . High values of Q 402 correspond to subjectively good partitions.
403
The difference of intracommunity links. The difference of 404 intracommunity links ( E c ) is to estimate the difference of 405 the number of intracommunity links between the original and 406 the optimized networks. Assuming that the optimized network 407 can be represented as an adjacency matrix A , the criterion 408 E c is computed as:
When E c is smaller than 0, it indicates that at least In this section, we test our algorithm on three real-world 419 networks, the electronic circuits, the USAir, and the road 420 networks, to illustrate that the community robustness of 421 networks can be largely enhanced when they suffer from 422 the weighted attacks. The related results of the R n -optimized 423 and the R c -optimized networks are recorded in constraints. As shown in Table I , optimizing R n can greatly 428 improve the node robustness of networks. More specifically,
429
R n is increased by 59.95% in the electronic circuit network.
430
In the USAir and the road networks, the improvements of R n 431 can reach 43.85% and 28.83%, respectively. However, the R n - results of the R n -optimized networks generated by optimizing
452
R n under the new constraints are also recorded in Table I .
453
The results in Table I clearly show that the R n -optimized 454 network partitions are more similar to the original ones.
455
The similarities between the R n -optimized and the original less than that in the R n -optimized networks.
463
As we can see from 
488
The results in Table I show that the values of R n and R c in 489 the R n -optimized networks are larger and smaller than that in 490 the R c -optimized networks, respectively, which indicate that 491 under the new constraints optimizing R n cannot guarantee the 492 improvement of R c and vice versa.
493
The spectrum index λ 1 /λ 2 has been used to evaluate 494 the node robustness of networks [16, 17, 31] . The studies in 495 Refs. [16, 17] indicated that the spectrum index has a certain 496 positive correlation with R n . However, the results in Table I 497 show that under the new constraints there is no obvious con-498 nection between R n and λ 1 /λ 2 . Without the added constraint, it 499 is found that both the R n and λ 1 /λ 2 values of the R n -optimized 500 networks are larger than that of the original ones. Moreover, we 501 observe that the spectrum index λ 1 /λ 2 has no obvious relation 502 with R c . Therefore, the spectrum index cannot represent the 503 node and the community robustness of networks under the new 504 constraints. for the electronic circuit, the USAir, and the road networks, 533 respectively. As both the node robustness and the community 534 robustness of networks can be greatly improved and the 535 community structures in the optimized networks basically 536 remain unchanged compared with the original ones when 537 α = 0.4, we set the parameter α as 0.4 in this study.
538
C. Experiment on real-world networks under the mixed attacks 539
In this section, we test our algorithm on two real-world 540 networks, the electronic circuits network and the USAir net-541 work, to illustrate that the community robustness of networks 542 can be largely enhanced when they suffer from the mixed 543 attacks. The R m values of the tested networks under different 544 f are reported in Fig. 10 . The results in Fig. 10 clearly show 545 that optimizing R n can improve the community robustness of 546 networks when f is large. However, it can hardly improve 547 the values of R m when f is small. More specifically, the R m 548 values of the R n -optimized networks are similar to that of 549 the original networks when f is smaller than 0.8 and 0.9 for 550 the electronic circuits and the USAir networks, respectively. an enormous amount of attentions in the last few years.
567
In this study, we propose a community robustness index to 568 evaluate the integrality of the community structure when the 569 network suffers from the modeled two-level targeted attacks. 
586
In the work of Schneider et al. [24] , it is found that the 587 robustness of a couple of interdependent networks can be 588 enhanced by establishing a minimum number of autonomous 589 nodes. Following this work, we can extend our work to 590 design a pair of interdependent networks with high community 591 robustness by establishing a set of autonomous nodes and com-592 munities. Therefore, our future work will aim at considering 593 the community robustness in interdependent networks. 
